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THE EXCESS-PROFITS TAX OF 1940-A CRITIQUE
By CraiFroRD J. HIN~ G*T HE Second Revenue Act of 19401 is a grating compromise of
conflicting theories of excess-profits taxation, the end-result of
which pleases neither Congress, the Treasury, nor business.2
The ink was not yet dry on the enrolled bill when prominent administra-
tion spokesmen suggested that it, like the Revenue Act of 1935, would
never go into effect because a better tax law would shortly supersede
it. There is every expectation that the present law will be substantially
amended, possibly within a few months, but according to a recent state-
ment of the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee these amend-
ments will not apply to 194o incomes. The recent "hardship" amend-
ments, which passed both Houses of Congress without debate or discus-
sion, are not really an exception to this statement since they invariably
operate to the advantage of the taxpayer.
The excess-profits tax of 1940 will be in effect for at least one year and
is worthy of study to the tax practitioners for that reason alone. More
importantly, a study of the present law will indicate the major changes
that may be expected from the forthcoming sessions of Congress. At the
present time it is of course impossible to predict the precise nature of
these changes, but one thing seems dear-the loopholes will be at least
* Price Stabilization Division, Advisory Commission to the Council on National Defense.
The opinions expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author, and do not in any
way reflect those of the commission.
' 54 Stat. 974 et seq. (194o). This article is concerned only with Titles II, III, IV, and V
of the act. Title II, entitled the Excess Profits Tax, became §§ 710-52 of the Internal Revenue
Code (26 U.S.C.A.). (Section references will hereafter be to the Internal Revenue Code.)
Title I raised the normal tax (including the defense tax increase on the larger corporations
under the first Revenue Act of i94o). 54 Stat. 5i7 (1940), 26 U.S.C.A. § 13 (Supp. 1940). The
normal tax on corporations with net incomes under $25,ooo remained unaffected by the
Second Revenue Act of i94o. The result was a graduation in the rate structure of the normal
tax from 14.85 per cent to 24 per cent, or a range of 9.i5 per cent, which amounts to a greater
rate preference for small corporations than has ever existed before. See Chapter II of the
author's study for the Temporary National Economic Committee, Taxation of Corporate
Enterprises (1941). Title VI of the 194o act provides for national service life insurance for
persons selected for military training, while Title VII is concerned with credits under the
federal unemployment tax for payments to the states.
2 The Treasury publicly disowned the tax in a stormy session before the Senate Finance
Committee. N.Y. Times, col. 3, p. i (Sept. 12, 1940).
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partially dosed and a stiffer tax liability will result for most large corpora-
tions. Rising defense expenditures are reason enough for this action. The
small corporations, however, can reasonably expect to continue their
present exemption.
It is easy to become overly critical of the present measure. It is ob-
viously not a "good" tax bill-in the sense that it will produce substantial
revenue without inequities. Nor is it a "simple" or easily understood bill
-most members of Congress have taken pride, apparently, in the fact
that prior to passage they had not read it in its entirety or, having read it,
did not understand its language. Yet it is a most important fact that the
Congress, after consideration lasting only a few months, saw fit to resur-
rect the idea of taxing the excess profits of corporations, a tax which had
been purged out of the statutes at large in 1921 by the unanimous chorus
of complaints from tax collectors, tax legislators, and taxpayers alike.
That first excess-profits tax was hated with even greater intensity than
the late surtax on undistributed profits.
The official custodian of the tax, the Honorable Carter Glass, sum-
marized his views on the excess-profits tax in his annual report as Secre-
tary of the Treasury in 1920:
The Treasury's objections to the excess-profits tax even as a war expedient (in
contradistinction to a war-profits tax) have been repeatedly voiced before the com-
mittees of the Congress. Still more objectionable is the operation of the excess-profits
tax in peacetimes. It encourages wasteful expenditure, puts a premium on overcapitali-
zation and a penalty on brains, energy, and enterprise, discourages new ventures, and
confirms old ventures in their monopolies. In many instances it acts as a consumption
tax, is added to the cost of production upon which profits are figured in determining
prices, and has been, and will, so long as it is maintained upon the statute books, con-
tinue to be, a material factor in the increased cost of living.3
His successor, Secretary Houston, also advocated the repeal of the tax
(urging in its stead a flat tax on "profits in excess of the distributed earn-
ings" of corporations):
The reasons for the repeal of the excess-profits tax should be convincing even to
those who on grounds of theory or general political philosophy are in favor of taxes of
this nature. The tax does not attain in practice the theoretical end at which it aims.
It'discriminates against conservatively financed corporations and in favor of those
whose capitalization is exaggerated; indeed, many overcapitalized corporations escape
with unduly small contributions. It is exceedingly complex in its application and
difficult of administration, despite the fact that it is limited to one class of business
concerns-corporations. Moreover, it is rapidly losing its productivity. The invested
capital of the average corporation, earning profits high enough to subject it to the
excess-profits tax, is now estimated to be increasing at the approximate rate of 32
3[192o] Treasury Ann. Rep. 23-24.
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per cent a year, while the income of the average corporation is almost certainly de-
clining at as great a rate. Both movements cut into the productivity of the tax. If
the present changes in capital and income continue for some time in the future, as now
seems probable, a large reduction may be expected in the yield of the excess-profits
tax. 4
Even the intellectual progenitor of the tax, Professor T. S. Adams,
hastened to add his condemnation. If there had ever been a tax which
was believed to have been permanently buried-and in unhallowed
ground at that-it was the excess-profits tax.
During consideration in the Senate of the first Revenue Act of i94o,
an amendment providing for an excess-profits tax on corporations was
introduced by Senator La FoletteS on June i9, i94o. This amendment
was adopted by a vote of 41 to 31, with 24 abstaining, only to be thrown
out in conference. The technical staffs of the Treasury and the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, it was understood, were
assigned to study the war experience with excess-profits taxation and
the various methods of avoiding the difficulties encountered previously
in the United States and currently abroad.
6
4 [192i] Treasury Ann. Rep. 38-39.
$ At the outset of his address Senator La Follette declared: "For Congress to broaden the
tax base on individuals in the lower income-tax brackets, for the Congress to increase the
inequities in our tax structure by tremendously increasing the burden which is levied without
regard to ability to pay, through the excise taxes, and to fail to adopt an excess-profits tax to
reach those who will profit out of the huge defense expenditures which Congress has voted will,
in my opinion, go down in history as one of the most inequitable propositions Congress has
ever passed." 86 Cong. Rec. 13027 (r94o). Realizing that he was "swimming upstream"
against the opposition of the Treasury and the majority members of the Finance Committee,
the Senator continued: "But, Mr. President, if the Treasury takes the position and furnishes
the ammunition against any proposed tax on excess profits merely because it thinks it has not
yet had a chance to draft a perfect amendment, I will say that we will never have an excess-
profits tax, for neither the Treasury experts nor the experts of the joint committee will ever
be able to draw an excess-profits tax or any other kind of a tax amendment that will be perfect
in character ..... I say that it is no answer for Senators to rise here and say that this is a
complicated question and that we will have to wait until the gentlemen from the Treasury
Department have concluded their studies and rendered their Olympian opinions before we
may act upon excess-profits legislation designed to spread more equitably the burden of this
terrific tax that is being laid upon the people by making corporations pay in proportion to their
ability to pay." Ibid., at 13o4o.
6 On June 24, 1940, the Canadian Minister of Finance, Mr. J. L. Ralston, announced a
radical revision of the excess-profits tax which had been enacted the previous fall. The op-
tional graduated rate based on invested capital was abolished and a single tax of 75 per cent
was imposed on the excess profits in any taxable year over those earned in the base of standard
period (1936-39), in addition to a minimum tax of 30 per cent on all corporate profits, irre-
spective of the magnitude of profits in the base period. The former option was declared to be
a very undesirable feature leading to unwarranted discriminations of the established firms
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On July r, i94o-little more than a week after the conference defeat
of Senator La Follette's proposal-President Roosevelt sent a special
message to Congress advocating the immediate enactment of a "steeply
graduated excess-profits tax" on corporations and individuals. On August
8, i94o, a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee
reported on "proposed excess-profits taxation and special amortization."
This report was a compromise between the views of the Treasury and the
staff of the Joint Committee, with the former preferring the "capital
method" of determining excess profits and the latter preferring the "income
method." Coupled with the proposed tax was (a) the suspension of the
Vinson-Trammell Act7 limiting profits on the construction of naval
vessels and aircraft for the duration of the new excess-profits tax and (b)
the allowance of accelerated depreciation or amortization of emergency
facilities constructed in connection with the defense program. On August
29 the House passed the new bill, viva voce and with only two hours'
debate on the floor; on September 19 the Senate passed a substantially
revised bill; on October i the conference version was approved by both
Houses; and on October, 8 the bill was signed by the President. At one
stage of the proceeding the bill was 489 drafting pages in length. The
Treasury was particularly concerned over the option between the "in-
(which would pay little or no tax) versus new firms undergoing rapid expansion or firms located
in depressed industries.
An administrative agency entitled the Board of Referees was established within the Depart-
ment of National Revenue to ascertain standards of profits for new businesses or businesses
depressed during the standard period, subject to the following considerations: (a) in the case
of depressed industries the standard profits shall be not less than 5 per cent or more than io per
cent of capital employed; (b) in the case of new industries other than gold mines or oil wells,
the board shall establish a standard of profits equal to the average rate of return of taxpayers
in similar circumstances engaged in the same or analogous classes of business; and (c) in cases of
gold mines or oil wells, the board shall establish a standard of profits "at such an amount which
they think just on the basis of a presumed volume of production during the standard period
equal to the volume of production in the taxation year and a presumed selling price for the
product during the standard period equal to the average selling price of the said product during
the standard period."
The following businesses were exempted from the new excess-profits tax, as amended:
(a) small businesses the profits of which do not exceed $5,ooo before withdrawals by pro-
prietors or share-holders, (b) personal corporations acting solely as investment-holding agen-
cies of individual Canadian taxpayers, and (c) non-resident-owned investment corporations.
The item of capital was redefined "having regard to the cost price of the assets presently em-
ployed by the taxpayer, less depreciation or depletion thereof, and deducting borrowed money
and debts, with a proviso that non-productive assets, assets not actually employed in the pro-
duction of profits, and assets producing tax exempt income, shall not be included."
7 48 Stat. 505 (i934), 3 4 U.S.C.A. § 496 (Supp. i94o), suspended by 54 Stat. ioo3 (ig4o),
34 U.S.C.A. § 49 6a (Supp. Feb. X94).
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come method" and "capital method" of determining excess profits and
over the nature of governmental control of the amortized facilities. On
both issues the viewpoint of the Treasury was rejected.8
From a revenue standpoint the present bill is very disappointing.
According to the 1942 budget message the Government expects a mere
$io6,ooo,ooo for fiscal i941 (which includes approximately half of the tax
liability for calendar 194o) and only $522,000,000 for fiscal 1942. During
World War I the reported tax liabilities under the excess-profits tax of
1918 amounted to two and a half billions, more than five times the esti-
mated figure for 1942!
CORPORATIONS SUBJECT TO THE TAX
By its terms the present excess-profits tax will apply to only a small
number of corporations. In 1937, for example, not more than 38,ooo
(i.e., corporations with a net income above $5,oo0) out of the 529,ooo
corporations which filed income tax returns with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue would have been required to file an excess-profits tax return,
and certainly less than half of these would have reported taxable excess
profits. 9 In i94o the Treasury representatives testified that they expect
not more than 70,000 corporations to be affected by the new excess-profits
tax. This larger figure is not unreasonable in view of the rising level of
industrial production and profits.
The following types of corporations (in addition to the corporations
already exempt from the normal corporate income tax) are expressly
exempt from the new excess-profits tax: 0
(a) Corporations with adjusted net income of not more than $5,ooo."C
(b) Mutual investment companies.-
(c) Registered diversified investment companies.
(d) Personal holding companies (already subject to special taxation under the 1937
Revenue Actx3).
8See infra pp. 449-53.
The exemption of most investment income and the inclusive definition of invested capital
may be expected to exempt substantially all public utilities and financial corporations, of which
in 1937 there were X7,922 with net incomes above $5,ooo.
xo § 729(b).
xx § 729(b). Net income for this purpose is defined as corporate profits (i.e., receipts less
the ordinary deductions) less the following: (a) all dividends received; (b) federal income
taxes; (c) long-term capital gains; (d) income from retirement or discharge of bonds; (e) re-
funds and interest on AAA taxes; (f) interest receipts on government obligations; and (g) re-
covered bad debts, which amount shall be added; (h) 5o per cent of interest paid out.
12 § 727.
13 See Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 41 (1937).
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(e) Foreign personal holding companies.
f) Foreign corporations not engaged in business in the United States and not having
any office located in the country.
(g) Domestic corporations, 95 per cent of the gross income of which is derived from
activities outside the United States during the three-year period immediately
prior to the tax for the year (with the further proviso that at least 50 per cent of
such gross income must be derived from the active conduct of business or trade).
The definitions of taxable income will operate to exempt substantially
the following from tax liability under the excess-profits tax:
(h) Holding companies, in view of the exemption of intercorporate dividends.'4
(i) Aviation companies having mail contracts.5
(j) Companies having merchant marine contracts.' 6
(k) Personal service corporations (at least 70 per cent of the stockholders must be
actively engaged in the business), the stockholders of which have agreed to be indi-
vidually taxed on their undistributed profits.27
(1) Corporations engaged in the mining of tungsten, quicksilver, manganese, platinum
and antimony, chromite, or tin, insofar as income is attributable to same. 8
This favoritism of corporations concerned with "strategic minerals"
closely parallels the special concessions (via extraordinary depletion)
which were made to oil companies during World War I.
AN ATTACK ON CORPORATE BIGNESS?
The Second Revenue Act of 1940 is on its face the most incisive attack
on corporate bigness that the federal revenue laws have ever attempted.
The rate structure of the new excess-profits tax varies directly with the
dollar magnitude of "excess profits."
Statutory Rate
Excess Profits Applicable(in per cent)
Of less than $20,000. ........................ 25
From $20,ooo to $5o,ooo ................... 30
From $50,000 to $ioo,ooo .................. 35
From $ioo,ooo to $250,000 ..................... 40
From $250,000 to $500,000 ..................... 45
Over $SOO,OOO ............................ 50
Under the excess-profits tax of World War I the rate varied with the exces-
siveness of the rate of profit as measured in relation to invested capital.
That is to say, the higher the rate of return on the capital the greater the
tax rate. The 1917 act contained five brackets ranging from a 2o per cent
tax on profits between 9 and 15 per cent on capital to a 6o per cent tax on
profits in excess of 333 per cent on capital. The 1918 act reduced the num-
14 § 71i. IS § 727. 16 § 726. 17 § 725. Z8 § 731.
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ber of brackets to two, with the dividing line put at profits of 20 per cent
on capital. The original proposal of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee in i94o varied the rate with the ratio between excess profits and the
credit for normal income (whether computed under the income or invested
capital methods) in terms of which the former was computed. The final
version of the tax results in much greater revenue productivity since the
highest tax rate (5o per cent) becomes applicable to substantially all large
corporations with excess profits, although their rate of return may be
barely over the minimum credit (8 per cent) under the "capital method."
Any plan of graduating the tax rate with the dollar magnitude of in-
come is threatened with evasion through the splitting of the taxpaying
units. In the field of individual income tax the choice method is separate
returns for husband and wife and even minors. In order to guard against
avoidance of the higher rates of the excess-profits tax the new law in-
troduced a very complicated provision in Supplement B entitled "Compu-
tation of Highest Bracket Amount in Connection with Exchanges."' 9
This provision operates to accelerate the graduation of the rate struc-
ture whenever corporations subdivide for the purpose of tax avoidance
so as to make the effective tax rate the same as if the corporation had not
split up into smaller entities. Such a provision would be unnecessary if
the graduation of the rates were based on corporate earning power (as
measured by the rate of profit on capital) rather than the dollar magni-
tude of profits, for since earning power does not change with a nominal
division of a corporation, firms would no longer have any tax incentive for
split-ups. This provision may on the whole be of rather academic interest
since the present tax applies only to the larger corporations which cannot
easily alter well-established patterns of corporate structure for tax pur-
poses.20
DEFINITION OF INCOME
The efficacy of high statutory rates obviously depends upon the meth-
ods of determining the tax base to which these rates apply. This problem
is the focal point of the great controversy about the present tax and of
course is the very essence of any proposal for taxing excess profits. Profits
may be said to be "excess" only in relation to a concept of "normal"
profits.
In determining whether or not a corporation has excess profits, it is
necessary to start from the concept of "taxable income" as developed in
'9 § 752.
20 For a fuller discussion of Supplement B, see Mobilization for Defense, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
326-27 (1940).
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the administration of federal corporate income taxation. Given this
definition of income, the i94o law provides r for a series of adjustments
of a plus-and-minus character to be made both in the taxable year and
in the so-called base period (for corporations electing to determine their
excess-profits tax liability under the "income method"22). These adjust-
ments take the form of the deduction or exclusion of items from taxable
income, as shown in Table r. The different types of adjustments of tax-
able income can only be rationalized in terms of the pecuniary interest of
the taxpayer. No rule of policy seems in evidence.
TABLE 1
DEDUCTIONS OR ExCLUSIONS FROM TAXABLE INcoME
UNDER TIM INCOMIE
MERTHOD UNDER TEE
TNVESTED
SPECIFIc INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ITEMS
In the In the METAL
Taxable Base
Year Period
Federal income taxes ................... Yes Yes Yes
Long-term capital gains and losses ........ Yes Yes Yes
Income from the retirement of bonds.. Yes Yes Yes
AAA refunds and interest ............... Yes Yes Yes
Bad debts recovered .................... Yes No Yes
Dividends on stocks of:
Domestic corporations ................ Yes Yes Yes
Foreign corporations ................ No No Yes
Foreign personal holding companies ..... No No No
Casualty losses ......................... No Yes No
Abnormal adjustments ................ No Yes No
Special expenditures for oil and gas drilling
and development ..................... No Yes No
Interest paid out ....................... No No Yes*
Interest received on government obligations No No Yest
One-half allowed.
t Only if included in invested capital.
In response to the frequently voiced demands at the hearings for a
general or a series of special relief provisions designed to take care of
hardships or "abnormalities in income" during the taxable period, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was authorized to spread over several
years any "abnormal" (i.e., in type) or "grossly disproportionate" (i.e.,
in amount) income of any one or more of the following classes:
(a) Arising out of a claim, award, judgment, or decree, or interest on any of the fore-
going; or
(b) Constituting an amount payable under a contract the performance of which re-
quired more than 12 months; or
12 The choice of the profits standard is discussed infra p. 453 et seq.21 E 711.
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(c) Resulting from exploration, discovery, prospecting, research, or development of
tangible property, patents, formulae, or processes, or any combination of the fore-
going extending over a period of more than 12 months; or
(d) Includible in gross income for the taxable year rather than for a different taxable
year by reason of a change in the taxpayer's accounting period or method of ac-
counting; or
(e) In the case of a lessor of real property, amounts included in gross income for the
taxable year by reason of the termination of the lease; or
(J) Dividends on stock of foreign corporations, except foreign personal holding
companies3
A relief provision was also adopted for the determination of equity
c4pital where records have been lost or destroyed.24
The special relief provisions will give rise to a new body of administra-
tive law, the cumulative effect of which will undoubtedly facilitate sub-
sequent legislation by having the "details" on hand instead of awaiting
"the filling in." The problem is one of the scope of administrative dis-
cretion of a very considerable magnitude with little or no statutory guid-
ance and little likelihood of judicial review.25 Only the most vocal com-
plainants obtained a hearing, and whether there are many unrecognized
"injustices" that cannot be handled under this section is not as yet
apparent. Undoubtedly there are some. 6 The conference report promised
that further study would be given to the subject.27
AMORTIZATION-TO ENCOUR1AGE DEFENSE EXPANSION
Special deduction for the amortization-or accelerated depreciation-
of special war-time facilities is permitted2s corporations certified by the
23 § 721. To these six classes the 1941 amendments added two general classes of income:
abnormal in kind, irrespective of whether such income fell under any of the six classes, and ab-
normal in amount (i.e., in excess of X25 per cent of such income during the four previous years).
24 § 723. Equity capital in this case consists of "(a) the money plus (b) the aggregate of the
adjusted basis of the assets of the taxpayer held by the taxpayer at such time, such sum being
reduced by the indebtedness outstanding at such time."
25 See Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 55' (1928). Note, however,
that the Board of Tax Appeals is specifically authorized to review such determination of the
commissioner. § 722.
26 Under § 713(a) no adjustment is provided for capital changes during the base period.
Where such adjustments are in the interest of the taxpayer he will undoubtedly claim, and
probably obtain, relief under § 721. But the Treasury can probably make no claim for relief.
27 The 1941 amendments are the consequence of this promise. Note that "abnormalities"
are now recognized not only during the taxable year but also during the base period as well
(under § 722).
28 § 124. 54 Stat. 999 (rg4o). Emergency facility is defined as "any facility, land, building,
machinery, or equipment, or part thereof, the construction, reconstruction, erection, or in-
stallation of which was completed after June io, x94o, or which was acquired after such date."§124(e) (I).
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Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and the Secre-
tary of War or Navy. The basis for amortizing such emergency facilities
is to be determined, not by the Treasury Department, but by the Defense
Commission. The cost of such facilities may, at the option of the corpora-
tion, be fully amortized over a five-year period in equal installments.
If, however, it should appear that the emergency has ceased before the
expiration of this five-year period, as ascertained by a Presidential proc-
lamation, the taxpayer may elect to amortize such cost fully within the
period that was actually regarded as emergency in character. In the
alternative the taxpayer may elect to take ordinary depreciation over the
normal expectancy of usefulness of the facility. A clause of the amortiza-
tion section provides that all contracts between the government and
corporations, out of which amortization claims may arise, shall be matters
of public record.29
Conflict arose between representatives of the Treasury and the Defense
Commission as to the type of governmental control to be exercised over
the future use and disposition of such facilities for which special amortiza-
tion was allowed for tax purposes. The Treasury was successful in per-
suading the House Ways and Means Committee to insert a provision
in the House bill, under which the taxpayer could not alter or destroy
amortized facilities without the express consent of the Secretary of War or
Navy. If such consent were not forthcoming, the government was obli-
gated to purchase the facilities in question from the taxpayer at a nominal
cost (i.e., at "not to exceed the adjusted basis but not to be less than
29 § X24(i).
30 These sections of H.R. 10413 as it stood on August 27, i94o, were as follows:
"(i) Destruction, etc., of facility.-Any taxpayer taking deductions for amortization of
emergency facilities pursuant to the provisions of this section may not thereafter destroy,
demolish, impair, or substantially alter such emergency facilities without the consent in writ-
ing of the Secretary of War or of the Secretary of the Navy. In the event such consent is not
given within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of written request therefor, the
Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, shall and he is hereby di-
rected to purchase such facilities at a price which he shall fix not to exceed the adjusted basis
but not to be less than $r. In case such facilities consist of buildings, or fixtures not removable
without substantially affecting the structure to which the same are affixed, the taxpayer shall
have an option to repurchase such facilities at the price which he was paid before such facilities
are resold to any other person.
"(j) Consent to provisions of subsection (i) .- No deduction for amortization under the pro-
visions of this section shall be allowed in any case unless the taxpayer files with the Commis-
sioner a signed statement acknowledging, and consenting to the application of, the provisions
of subsection Qi). Such statement shall be signed and acknowledged under oath by the person
or persons required to swear to returns made by the corporation under this chapter.
"(k) Penalty for destruction, etc., of facility.-If the Secretary of War or the Secretary of
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At the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee several mem-
bers of the Defense Commission appeared to protest the Treasury formu-
lation which the House had adopted. It was contended that the cases of
amortization were so numerous and varying in quality that the protection
of the government's interest in the future disposition of such amortized fa-
cilities was more amenable to contract provisions than to legislative rule.-3
the Navy certifies to the Secretary of the Treasury that a taxpayer subject to the provisions
of subsection (i) has wilfully destroyed, demolished, impaired, or altered substantially any
emergency facility without having first obtained the written consent of the Secretary of War or
the Secretary of the Navy to such destruction, demolition, impairment, or alteration, then
such taxpayer shall be liable to a penalty in an amount equal to the unadjusted basis of such
facility in the hands of the taxpayer for the purpose of computing gain, to be assessed, col-
lected, and paid in the same manner as if it were a tax imposed by this chapter. Such pen-
alty may be assessed or a proceeding in court for the collection of such penalty may be begun
without assessment at any time within one year after the date of such certification."
3z A memorandum submitted by the Defense Commission outlined the following three
methods of procuring new facilities and the applicable rule of amortization:
"PLAN I.-Private ownership with no government interest.
Purpose: When manufacturer desires to own the facilities at all times and does not include
in the product price an abnormal amount for depreciation or amortization.
Financing: Private, including Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans.
Title: Vested in manufacturer.
Methods of operation: By manufacturer in the normal way.
Reimbursement: None other than by way of normal depreciation.
Amortization: Certified for tax purposes as needed for national defense.
Termination: No protection for contractor.
Provision for subsequent use by manufacturer: Continued use by the contractor.
"PLAN 1.-Private ownership with government interest.
Purpose: For plants in which the manufacturer desires to preserve a future interest.
Financing: Private, including Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans.
Title: Vested in the manufacturer.
Method of operation: By manufacturer.
Reimbursement: Cost to be repaid to manufacturer in five equal annual installments.
Payments to be subject to acceleration if supply contracts run out.
Amortization: Certified for tax purposes as required for national defense.
Termination: At end of 5-year period, or earlier termination of the emergency, the manu-
facturer may continue to use the facilities if he pays to the Government the then fair
value thereof as determined by arbitrators; otherwise contractor transfers title to the
new facilities to the Government.
Provision for subsequent use by manufacturer: No right to use unless payment made as
set forth under heading "Termination" above.
"Pr.AN mI.-Government ownership.
Purpose: For plant in which Government desires to have permanent interest or in which
the manufacturer has no future interest.
Financing: Government funds, either Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Defense
Corporation, Army or Navy.
Title: Vested in the Government.
Method of operation: Leased to the manufacturer.
[Footnote 31 continued on page 452]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
The House version, it was argued, was the equivalent of throwing out all
hopes of private financing of defense facilities.32
The compromise measure reached was the rather superfluous require-
ment that the certificate (as to the emergency character of the facility)
should contain a declaration on the part of the Defense Commission that
existing contracts contain provisions which "adequately protect the
United States with reference to the future use and disposition of such
[Footnote 31 continued from page 451]
Reimbursement: Not applicable (Government owned).
Amortization for tax purposes: Not applicable (Government owned).
Termination: Government will take over facilities whenever lease terminates.
Provision for subsequent use by manufacturer: None."
Senate Finance Committee Hearings on H.R. 10413, 7 6th Cong. 3d Sess., at 186 (1940).
32 The argument may be summarized in the following quotations from Commissioner
Henderson's testimony:
"Mr. Henderson. Let me say this: If (i), G), and (k) were left in, as far as the possibility
of the use of plan i is concerned, I believe you might just as well drop this whole rapid amorti-
zation out of the picture, because what you are in effect saying under (i), (j), and (k), is that
a manufacturer having paid for facilities out of his own funds, has got to surrender those, in
effect, to the Government.
"Now you take in this case of the $i,ooo,ooo increase in facilities which the manufacturer
put up under the example given by Mr. Biggers, in which there is a recapture of $i5oooo for
tax allowances, now all of it has been depreciated, has it not, at $2ooooo a year?
"Mr. Biggers. Yes.
"Mr. Henderson. And under the circumstances existing here, the Government can recap-
ture that for about a dollar. It is not the Government's property, Senator Clark, it is a
plain question of whose property this is. There is just absolutely no reason in the world for
passing this rapid amortization feature as any kind of encouragement to the use of private
capital if you leave subsections (i), (j), and (k) in .......
"Senator Clark. Mr. Henderson, I understand perfectly that you cannot write into the
statute every detail of negotiations. In spite of the very complex details we have in the tax
bills, we still have a good deal of regulation. It seems to me that the Congress at least ought.
to write the rules into the statute; in other words, the classifications at least which the Defense
Council itself has made, which are presented to us by Mr. Biggers. They ought to be written
into the statute.
"Mr. Henderson. Well, I see a great deal of difficulty under that Procrustean bed, in
negotiating that kind of contract, to negotiate for the thousands of articles that there are.
"Senator Clark. That is not any more a Procrustean bed to the Congress than it is to the
Defense Council, to lay down the rules.
"Mr. Henderson. I disagree with you.
"Senator Clark. You mean to say that the Defense Council can depart from rules laid
down by itself? I think that is true.
'.'Mr. Henderson. I think they should. If they do their work honestly, I think they should,
because what is needed in the instant years is to get the material at the lowest price.
"Senator Clark. That has always been the excuse for the war contractor to gouge the
Government.
"Senator Barkley. You have got to be able to deviate now and then from the rules in order
to prevent the other fellow from having the biggest end of the skid pole." Ibid., at 176-77.
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emergency facility." This requirement is superfluous because the con-
tract either does or does not protect the public interest. If it does, the
declaration is unnecessary. If it does not protect the public interest, it
is equally obvious that the contract should never have been made. It
serves only to put the defense contractors on guard as to this particular
phase of the contracting process.
The amortization deduction will undoubtedly result in a substantial
loss in revenue from what the same would have been if only ordinary
depreciation had been allowed. This statement is true, however, only if
the excess-profits tax is repealed or substantially lightened after five years.
If the tax remains in effect at the present or higher levels, the revenue has
primarily been postponed and not permanently lost. The available data
on amortization so far claimed (but not necessarily allowed) indicates
surprisingly small magnitudes. Tax "certificates of necessity" issued by
the Defense Commission through the month of January total up to
$192,ooo,ooo for 1i6 companies, the largest claim being that of the Beth-
lehem Steel Company. 33 Yet the net tax savings for specific corporations
is apt to be very substantial, as may be illustrated by Bethlehem Steel
Company, where it is estimated that approximately two-6fths of the cost
of new plant facilities will probably be recouped as a net tax saving. 34
CHOICE OF THE PROFITS STANDARD
The taxpayer may ordinarily elect to determine the fact and the
amount of "excess profits" either (a) by a comparison of earnings in the
taxable year with earnings during the base period of i936-39 inclusive,
33 Office of Production Management, press releases of Jan. 21 and Feb. io, 1941.
34 This may be shown by considering the following figures:
Assumptions
Proposed expansion of the Bethlehem Steel Co ............ $38 ,794,000*
Maximum permissible 1940 earnings .................... 42,ooo,ooot
Estimated 194o earnings after ordinary depreciation ....... 70,00,000
Gross savings via amortizationt
From normal tax (24 per cent of amortised expansion) ...... 9,310,560
From excess-profits tax (So per cent of amortised expansion). 19,397,000
Total gross savings ............................................ $28,707,56o
Deduct§
N=ormal depreciation, 1941-45
Normal tax (24 per cent of expansion) ................. $ 2,237,640
Excess-profits tax (So per cent of t of expansion) ....... 4,849,250
Normal depreciation, 1946-61 (20 per cent of J of expan-
sion) . .. ...................................... 5,819,100
Total deductions from gross savings ............................. 12,905,510
Net savings ................................. ...................... 15,801,570
Percentage of original cost saved ..................................... . 40.5
* OPM press releases. t Derived from Table 4, infra, p. 465.
Assuming profits for 1941-45 will range at least as high as for x940.
§ Assuming ordinary depreciation at 2o years, no excess-profits tax after 1945, and nor-
mal corporate tax at 20 per cent.
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or (b) by a computation of the rate of return on invested capital.35 Under
the 1941 amendments it is necessary for a corporation to include computa-
tions of tentative tax liability under both methods unless it expressly
"disclaims" one or the other method. The final tax liability will be deter-
mined by whichever method results in the lower liability.36 This elec-
tion between these two very different methods of determining excess
profits may be made (a) by all domestic corporations in existence prior
to January i, i94o, including any "acquiring corporation which was in
existence on the date of the beginning of its base period" (i.e., x936)
and (b) by any foreign corporations which were in existence for the forty-
eight months prior to the taxable year. All other corporations must em-
ploy the invested capital method.37
Under the original House version, the election between the two methods
was confined, logically, to corporations with earnings records throughout
the base period. Since there is no "ceiling" to profits under the income
method and a "ceiling" of 8 per cent is placed on profits under the invested
capital method, it is obvious that well established corporations with high
earning records31 in the past will find themselves with a distinct advantage
over new and expanding corporations whose earnings record has not been
sufficiently long to serve as a base period (i.e., 1936-39). A Senate amend-
ment permits the computation (according to the invested capital method)
of putative earnings for such years in the base period as the corporation
was not in existence, and the employment of the actual dollar earnings
for such years as are available (including in all cases 1939, a year of very
high earnings for many companies). The 1941 amendments go one step
further by providing for a special upward adjustment of the earning credit
for corporations with substantially higher earnings in the second half
(1938-39) of the base period as compared with the first half (1936-37).
In practical effect this amounts to the selection of 1939 earnings as the
definition of standard profits for all corporations with comparatively low
earnings in 1937. Other corporations will not avail themselves of this ad-
justment. To this extent the election between the two methods has be-
come available to new and expanding corporations which otherwise (that
3s 712.
36 § 729. Under the regulations, failure of the corporation to present the dual computations
in its tax return, without an express disclaimer, shall be regarded as failure to file a tax return,
with all that that implies in the way of penalties.
37 § 740.
38 Prior years' earnings must have at least exceeded 8.42 per cent of capital in order to
make the election of the "income method" advisable.
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is, under the House version) would have been compelled to employ the
invested capital method.
In order to offset the undoubted advantage of the income method to
large successful corporations, the House bill provided for an additional
normal tax of 4.1 per cent on all corporations choosing that method of
computing excess profits. Much of the business testimony before the
Senate Finance Committee centered on this penalty tax proposal. The
final result was to raise the normal tax 3.1 per cent on all corporations
with net incomes above $25,ooo, irrespective of their method of com-
TABLE 2
CREDIT FOR "NORMAL" PROFITS UNDER INCOME AND CAPITAL
METHODS OF DETERMINING ExcEss PROFITS
INCOME CAPITAL M.Ammum-iooMEruOD MExTEoD
INDUSTR NSM O  (IN MLOS 
(IN MILLIONS
IN MILIOS (IN MILIOS OF DOLLARS) Income CapitaloF DOLLARS) oF DOLLARS) Method Method
Aircraft ................. 9-7 6.6 9-7 100 65
Autos ................... 84.9 79-7 184.9 1OO 43
Chemicals ............... 91-7 66.7 91.7 1oo 73
Machinery .............. 34-4 37.2 41.0 84 90
Nonferrous metals ........ 85.6 84.9 107.9 79 79
Petroleum ............... 139.1 195-9 195.9 71 loo
Steel .................... 84.9 178.4 178.4 48 loo
Tires ................... 23.5 30. 1 30. 78 100
Total ............... 653.8 679.5 840.7 78 81
Source: Derived from Table 4, which presents he data for individual companies. Each industry inTable 2 is
represented by three compaaies.
puting excess profits and to lower the credit for past earnings from ioo
per cent to 95 per cent.39
The option of the present law works to the disadvantage of the fisc,
since each taxpayer will obviously choose the method resulting in the
maximum credit for "normal" profits and consequently in the minimum
liability under the excess-profits tax. The approximate magnitudes in-
volved for eight industries more or less closely associated with defense
efforts is shown in Table 2. The choice between the two methods of
computing excess profits results, according to this table, in a credit for
normal profits that is approximately 20 per cent higher than the credit
computed under either method exclusively. In the case of steel, tires,
and petroleum the maximum profits credit was identical with that com-
39 The House version also contained a 5 per cent differential in the excess-profits tax rate
structure, but this was abandoned in conference.
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puted under the capital method, since these are industries with charac-
teristically heavy capital structures. On the other hand, the maximum
profits credit was identical with that computed under the income method
in chemicals, autos, and aircraft-all industries with high profits records
in the past.
Under the income method of determining excess profits, 4° a corporation
is permitted to claim an excess-profits credit of 95 per cent of the "average
base period of income" subject to the adjustments already set forth.
Wherever a taxpayer experiences a loss in one or more of the years in the
base period, he may treat such loss as zero if it occurs in one year, or if it
occurs in more than one year he may treat the largest loss as zero and
deduct the remaining loss from his income in the other years of the base
period. In no case may the average base period of net income be a nega-
tive quantity. There is no attempt under the present law to make the
earnings record in a taxable year strictly comparable with that in the base
period. It is thus possible for a corporation with decreasing capital to
continue to claim an excess-profits credit of the same magnitude as in
the past, regardless of the fact that such past earnings accrued when the
capital employed was substantially larger than it may be in the taxable
year. Conversely, a corporation with increasing capital will find itself
limited to the dollar amount of earnings in the past when its earnings
were based on a smaller capital. The only provisions which may amelio-
rate these difficulties are to be found in the hardship clause and in the
sections dealing with structural changes in the corporate entity.4' The
former is only invocable upon call by the taxpayer and the latter applies
only to changes occurring during the taxable year.
Under the income method it is possible for firms, which, by reason
of their competitive position or otherwise, have enjoyed high earnings
in the past, to continue earning such high profits without fear of federal
taxation of "excess profits." This possibility is particularly true of those
corporations which enjoyed an exceedingly high rate of return in the
latter half of 1939, which was in many respects a war year for American
industry.
The method of defining excess profits in the present by referring to
profit standards in the past is suitable at best only for a short-run or
emergency tax program. With the passing of time the standard will either
become relatively obsolete or will have to be brought up to date by a
moving average technique, and will thus include in its definition the high
40 § 713(a).
4X §§ 721 and 740 et seq.
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earnings of war years. Such a definition will tend to defeat itself. Any
program which contemplates a permanent excess-profits tax requires,
therefore, that the tax be predicated on some basis other than a mere
dollar comparison of the earnings in prior years.
The provisions applicable to the invested capital method of determining
excess profits are without question the- most complicated part of the
present excess-profits tax law.42 In fairness, however, it should be pointed
out that these provisions are at present considerably less complex than
those found in either the House or the first Senate version. Considerable
simplification resulted from the divorce of the "invested capital method"
from any comparison of earnings in the base period. Under the original
version of the House Ways and Means Committee it was necessary for a
taxpayer employing the invested capital method to compute the rate
of return on capital during the four years of the base period and to com-
pare the same with his rate of return in the taxable year. The excess of
earnings over the average rate of return in the base period was taxable,
provided that the rate of return in the taxable year was not less than
4 per cent and not more than io per cent. Under the present law excess
profits are defined as any income in any taxable year in excess of 8 per
cent of the "taxpayer's invested capital for the taxable year. '43
Invested capital for the taxable year is defined as the "average invested
capital," which is in turn defined as the "aggregate daily invested capital
for each day of such taxable year, divided by the number of days in such
taxable year." "Daily invested capital" is in turn defined as "the sum
of the equity invested capital for such day plus the borrowed invested
capital for such day."44 Equity invested capital is defined in essentially
an historical sense45 and consists of the sum of:
i. Money paid in (for stock, as paid-in surplus, or as contribution to capital).
2. Property paid in (other than money)-"in an amount equal to its basis (unadjusted)
for determining loss upon sale or exchange."
42 §§ 714-20, 723, 750-52.
43 § 714.
44 §§ 715-17. The statute contains a mysterious suggestion (of which the Regulations re-
main eloquently silent) that the daily basis of computing invested capital may be dispensed
with whenever another determination differs from the former by not more than $i,ooo. This
difference can hardly be ascertained without making the daily computation, so why bother?
4s See LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (X921), where the Supreme Court
sternly frowned upon marked-up valuations to take into account the appreciation of assets
(e.g., the discovery of ore on agricultural lands), even where the mark-up occurred years
before the imposition of the tax.
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3. Distributions in stock (a) in prior years to the extent considered distribution of
earnings and profit, or (b) during the taxable year to the extent considered dis-
tribution of other than earnings and profits of such taxable year.
4. Accumulated earnings and profits at the beginning of the year.
5. Increase on account of gain on tax-free liquidation. This amount shall be reduced
by the sum of:
a) Distributions in previous years not out of accumulated earnings and profits.
b) Distributions in a taxable year out of earnings and profits other than of that
taxable year.
c) Earnings and profits of another corporation.
d) On account of loss on tax-free liquidation.46
The other part of invested capital is "borrowed invested capital"
which is defined as 50 per cent of (i) the amount of outstanding indebted-
ness, excluding interest, which is "evidenced by a bond, note, bill of ex-
change, debenture, certificate of indebtedness, mortgage, or deed of
trust;" and (2) contracts made before November 8, 194o, with a foreign
government, upon which an advance payment was made subject to
cancellation and repayment.
Invested capital, as above defined, may not include assets, the income
of which is tax-exempt. Such assets are termed "inadmissible assets"
and include (a) stocks in other corporations (except stock in a foreign
personal holding company) and (b) government obligations, the interest
on which is treated by the taxpayer as tax-exempt. The process of "inad-
mitting" these assets is not the simple and straightforward technique of
subtracting the same from invested capital. The law provides instead that
the taxpayer first compute the ratio of inadmissible assets to total assets
and apply that ratio to invested capital (as defined above). The resultant
figure is then deducted from invested capital.
The advantage accrues from the fact that the computed deduction is
invariably smaller than the actual amount of inadmissible assets-since
total assets are always greater than unadjusted invested capital-with the
result that invested capital remains high, while inadmissible income is
wholly excluded from the taxable income.
The scheme is said to be required because of the partial omission of bor-
rowed capital from the invested capital base and the consequent difficulty
of exclusively attributing inadmissible assets to either equity or creditor
capital. This difficulty is largely theoretical, since corporations are wont
to borrow money for the purpose of purchasing government securities
or corporate stocks on only rare occasions and then largely in such indus-
tries as public utilities and finance which are practically unaffected by the
41 § 718(a) and (b).
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present tax. Comparison of the total amount of new bonds and notes is-
sued during recent years by registered corporations and the amount there-
of devoted to the acquisition of securities clearly supports this statement.
The differential interest rates of public and private bonds make it most
unlikely that creditor capital will be used for the purpose of acquiring
government securities. Investment in fully controlled affiliates is, of
course, not reflected in consolidated balance sheets. It is difficult to see
much reason in the present provision since inadmissible income (i.e., divi-
dend income and tax-exempt interest) can be so easily connected with the
inadmissible assets (i.e., stocks and tax-exempt bonds) upon which the
former accrues.
Observe, moreover, that the taxpayer is given the option of treating
government obligations as an admissible asset provided the interest re-
ceived on such obligations has been included in taxable income for both
the normal tax and the excess-profits tax.
The concept of "invested capital" as set forth above was believed
generally to be an improvement over the definitions contained in the old
excess-profits tax, particularly by abandoning the old distinction between
tangible and intangible contribution and by attenuating the distinction
between equity and creditor capital. The first is definitely an improve-
ment since the 1917-21 laws hopelessly confused the concepts of tangible
and intangible property. 47
The partial inclusion of creditor capital is quite another story. Under
the original House version it was proposed to vary the proportion of
borrowed capital which might be included according to the size of the
corporation. Where equity capital was less than $ioo,ooo, borrowed
capital was fully includible insofar as the sum of the invested capital and
borrowed capital did not exceed $ioo,ooo; the balance of borrowed
capital up to a sum of equity and borrowed capital of $i,ooo,ooo at the
rate of 66' per cent and the balance exceeding $i,ooo,ooo at the rate
of 33 per cent.
This gradation in the proportion of borrowed capital which may enter
into invested capital was designed to favor small enterprise. It was said
that small enterprise has greater difficulty in obtaining equity capital
in the market than big business. This statement may not be entirely true.
A more correct generalization would be that small corporations experience
substantial difficulties in obtaining funds in the capital market irrespec-
tive of the nature of such capital.
There are much greater industrial differences in the relative importance
47 See the author's monograph, op. cit. supra note i, at 122.
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of borrowed and invested capital than there are size differences. Borrowed
capital is very important to railroads and practically all types of public
utilities, and also to hotels, apartment houses, all types of real estate
concerns, and many corporations classified as "financial." 45 Since the
rate of interest on borrowed capital is rarely in excess of 4 or 5 per cent,
TABLE 3
PREFERENTIAL CREDIT FOR BORROWED INVESTED CAPITAL
UNDER THE EXCESS-PROFITS TAX
(In Millions of Dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PREaEDEN1XAL CREDIT 0
COMPANIES CEDIT FOR ONEA 
T PORE WED CRN ITAL
CAITAL BORROWED NTEREST
CREIT* CAPITALt
1939 Amount of (1)
Bethlehem .............. 45-7 7.3 3.6 3-7 8.1
Republic Steel ............ 23.9 3.4 2.2 1.2 5.0
U.S. Steel ............... x9.5 9.6 4.7 4-9 4.1
Allis-Chalmers ........... 6.7 1.0 -5 .5 7-5
Firestone ................ o.5 1.8 1.o .8 7.6
Goodyear ............... 12.1 1.8 .8 1.0 8.3
U.S. Rubber ............. 10.4 1.7 -9 .8 7-7
Anaconda ............... 40.9 2.0 1.2 .8 2.0
Socony-Vacuum ........... 50.9 6.o 2.4 3.6 7.1
Standard Oil (N.J.) ....... 116.4 12.1 4.8 7-3 6.3
Texas Co ................ 37-5 4.3 1.8 -5 1.3
Total ............... 474.5 51.0 23.9 25.1 5-3
* Per cent of invested capital at the end of z939. Invested capital includes equity capital less inadmissible
assets plus 5o per cent of borrowed capital.
t 9 per cent of 5o per cent of borrowed capital.
t (2) less (s).
Source: Computed from SEC Survey of American Listed Corporations.
and the ceiling provision in the excess-profits tax is placed at 8 per cent,
it is obvious that any provision which permits the inclusion of both
borrowed capital and interest for computing excess profits operates to
depress the rate of return from what it would be with reference to the
earnings of equity capital. This provision will operate to the advantage
of corporations having substantial borrowed capital.
The importance of preferential credit for borrowed capital to eleven
corporations is shown in Table 3. The maximum credit, according to
Table 4, is computed under the capital method. Observe that in several
48 Ibid., at 30, 91-95.
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cases (notably in steel, rubber, and petroleum refining companies) this
preferential credit for borrowed capital amounted to as much as 8 per cent
of the total credit claimable for invested capital.
A parallel case is the option of the taxpaying corporation to include
in taxable income all interest received on governmental securities and
likewise to expand invested capital by including therein the value of tax-
exempt securities upon which such interest is payable. It is definitely to
the advantage of the corporation to exercise this option whenever it has a
tentative excess-profits tax liability arising out of other income and the
rate of interest on tax-exempt securities does not exceed 61 per cent.49
The excess credit-i.e., difference between the yield on the tax-exempt
securities after the normal tax and 8 per cent of the value of the tax-
exempt securities-operates to reduce the amount of the excess-profits
tax on such other income.
To illustrate, a corporation has excess profits from operating sources
in the amount of $,5oo,5ooo. Its excess-profits tax thereon would amount
to $7o4,ooo. Assume it has $3oo,ooo in interest received from state and
local bonds which, capitalized at 3 per cent, are valued at $io,ooo,ooo.
By exercising this option the corporation will find itself subject to an
additional normal tax of $72,ooo on its tax-exempt interest, but it will
also acquire an unused excess-profit credit of $572,ooo (i.e., $8oo,ooo less
$228,000) which, when applied against operating excess profits of $1,500,-
ooo, reduces taxable excess profits to $928,ooo. Instead of an excess-
profits tax liability of $704,000 the corporation by exercising this option
can reduce the same to $418,ooo plus an additional normal tax of $72,ooo,
making a total tax liability of $49o,ooo. This is equivalent to a tax saving
of 30 per cent. The effect of this option will therefore be to reduce sub-
stantially the excess-profits tax liability on operating income of all cor-
porations holding tax-exempt securities.
The inclusion of undistributed profits in eluity capital will undoubtedly
operate as a powerful incentive further to retain profits within the cor-
poration instead of distributing them to stockholders. The famous un-
distributed profits tax of i936-37s° no longer threatens corporations that
49 The maximum interest rate was calculated as follows. Assumptions: normal tax of 24
per cent and excess-profits tax of 5o per cent. The excess-profits credit for tax-exempt interest
must exceed the sum of (a) tax-exempt interest after the normal tax and (b) double the amount
of the normal tax. Expressing tax-exempt interest as ioo, capital is 76 + 48 = 1,550,
and the rate of return is -)o = 6.4516 per cent.
1,55o
s For an examination of its operation in different industries and size groups, see the
author's monograph, op. cit. supra note i, at 70-79, 88-9o, 95.
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retain a high proportion of their profits, while the high individual surtax
rates continue to furnish a strong tax inducement to delay realization.
There is in fact every indication that corporate savings will grow by
leaps and bounds. There is need for expansion, of course, but the tax
preference arising from large borrowed capital is more conducive to
defense expansion financed by borrowing than by internal sources. The
prospect under the new excess-profits tax is therefore further stimulus to
(a) non-distribution of corporate profits and consequent avoidance of
the individual surtax and (b) debt financing.
The present internal revenue laws permit the taxpayer to carry over
his net operating loss for a two-year period.s' This net loss carry-over
provision is of course applicable to the determination of excess-profits
tax liability. The present law makes no other provision for the carry-
over of operating losses. However, a carry-over of the unused profits
credit for one year is permitted in corporations with net income not in
excess of $25,ooo.2 As originally drafted in the Senate version, this
carry-over of the unused excess-profits credit was limited to corporations
in the preservation or canning of food, vegetable, and fish products. In
the course of the conference discussion, this provision was converted
from one limited to the specified industries to one applicable to all small
corporations.
The failure to consider to a greater extent the role of industrial fluctua-
tions will probably lead to some of the most serious inequities of the
excess-profits tax. There are many industries where profits fluctuate
widely from year to year, and the occurrence of a substantial profit for
one year to be followed by several lean years is hardly a case of "excess
profits." The artificiality of the calendar year for tax purposes will per-
haps be nowhere more keenly felt than in the administration of excess-
profits taxation.
A procedural innovation of substantial importance to the revenues is
the reintroduction of permissive consolidated returns for purposes of the
excess-profits tax. Normal tax liabilities will continue to be determined
upon an unconsolidated basis save in the case of railroads and related
carriers. This privilege is confined to closely interamfiliated corporations,
at least 95 per cent of the voting stock of which is owned by the various
members of the affiliated group.5 ' It should be noted that only a single
S' § 23(s).
52 § 710(b)(3). Under the i941 amendments the limitation as to size of income has been
removed and another year added to the carry-over.
sl § 730.
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exemption of $5,000 is allowed a consolidated group regardless of the
number of corporations within such group.
This reintroduction of permissive consolidated tax returns was made
in response to the practically unanimous request of business spokesmen
and was only half-heartedly resisted by representatives of the Treasury.
It should be observed, however, that it is permitted only in the case of
excess-profits taxation and that single returns must be filed for the nor-
mal tax and the declared-value excess-profits tax by each corporation
regardless of the character of its affiliation with other corporations.
Corporations may consequently file tax returns on both a consolidated
and unconsolidated basis. Under such circumstances it is difficult to see
what administrative convenience-to either the tax collector or the
taxpayer-may lie in this method.
However, the consolidated tax returns device does possess real tax
advantages to the paying corporation, particularly in a period of declining
profits. The author has demonstrated elsewhere4 that consolidated tax
returns result (a) at most in the same amount of revenue that would be
collected from the taxation of each corporation as a unit, irrespective of
its affiliations with other corporations, and (b) frequently, especially
in a period of declining profits, in a very substantial loss of revenue. The
loss of revenue results from the deduction from the profits of one corpora-
tion of the losses of another corporation, both of which are members of an
interaffiliated system.
The argument in favor of consolidated returns is predicated on the
principle that the tax laws should conform to economic reality-a proposi-
tion from which it is difficult to dissent in the abstract-and that a parent
and subsidiaries are all members of one big happy family. Anyone who
has studied intercorporate relationships knows that this unity is evi-
denced only in happy relationships, and that whenever an unhappy
question is raised the members of the interaffiliated system are quick to
assert their separate identities. In other words, the consolidated returns
device operates as a distinct tax advantage to holding companies and
related types of intercorporate affiliations. Its restoration at the present
time on the ground of administrative convenience or necessity will amount
to just that.
The other argument, of course, is that the Treasury has more difficulty
in enforcing the tax laws when separate tax returns are required from
each corporation, regardless of its relationship to other corporations. This
administrative argument has been particularly stressed in the case of
s4 Monograph, op. ct. supra note 1, at 45-52.
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excess-profits taxation. There is obviously some merit in it. There can
be no question but that it takes more time to audit a series of separate
returns than to audit consolidated returns. But this increased adminis-
trative problem must be balanced against the loss of revenue entailed in
the consolidated method. Under the normal tax, for example, it is esti-
mated that the reintroduction of consolidated returns along the lines
provided in the Revenue Act of 1928 would result in a loss of revenue
of between sixty and two hundred million dollars. It may be suggested
that with one million dollars it is possible to hire a flock of very good tax
auditors.
The language of the new section closely parallels the terms laid down
by the Revenue Act of 3928, and invests the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue with full regulatory authority to fill in the necessary details.
These details are going to be extremely hard to provide, especially in the
case of corporations electing to determine their excess profits under the
income method. This difficulty arises out of the fact that their taxable
receipts and deductions for the taxable year will be prepared on a con-
solidated basis which are to be compared to their earnings in the base
period during which, of course, no consolidated returns were permitted
except in the case of railroads and related common carriers. If such a
comparison is to mean anything, it will be necessary to consolidate the
receipts and deductions for all the members of the affiliated group for the
base period, a rather sizable job. Even in the case of the excess-profits
tax, the Treasury has more to gain from separate tax returns than it
stands to lose in the way of increased administration. From the side
of economic policy, the tax laws should not be permitted to give further
advantages to the holding company device.
It should be dear from the foregoing that the present excess-profits
tax cannot fall very heavily on most industrial corporations. This con-
clusion derives statistical support from the following table which presents
data for twenty-four large companies in chemicals, steel, autos, aircraft,
machinery, tires, nonferrous metals, and petroleum refining. The calcula-
tions are based on the profit-and-loss statements and balance sheets
filed by the companies with the Securities and Exchange Commission
under the authority of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5
It is of course obvious that the SEC records are not strictly comparable
with tax records. The error, however, is apt to be in the way of an over-
statement of tax liability. Since the attached table shows that the typical
excess-profits tax liability is zero or relatively low for most of the selected
5S ee also the report of Standard Statistics, Excess Profits Taxes (Nov. 4, i94o).
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TABLE 4
EXCESS-PROFITS TAX CREDITS FOR 24 LARGE CORPORATIONS IN
8 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(In Millions of Dollars)
CREDIT FOR ESTIMATED
PRONT oasa," TO EPT EPTRAT PROFITS FREE
COMPANIES 1939* CREASE(IN PER Income Capital 1939- Effec-
CENT) Meth- Meth- z939§ 194011 40 Amount tive
odt odl Rate
Allied Chemical and Dye. 14.38 18.2 10.7 19.3 2X.5 0 1. 6 5-4
duPont ................ 15.30 40.5 34-7 52.5 79.8 0 i9.6 13.6
United Carbide & Carbon 13.17 33.0 21.3 35-5 ** 0 ** **
Bethlehem ............. 5.26 17.9 42.2 24.6 55.0 76 6.4 7.2
Republic Steel .......... 4.56 6.7 21.6 10.4 I5.8 107 0 0
U.S. Steel .............. 3. 6 6o.3 1i4.6 40.6 ioo.o 182 0 0
Chrysler ............... 24.03 39.8 13.5 36.8 46.4 8 3-3 5-4
General Motors ........ 18.41 z42.6 63.0 154.3 219.8 0 38.5 12.0
Packard ............... 1.27 2.5 3.2 .6 ** 478 ** **
Curtiss-Wright ......... 6.25 2.8 2.9 5.2 ** 0 ** **
Glenn Martin.......... 24-73 2.0 2.3 4.1 4-3 0 2.3t t 26.0
United Aircraft ......... 29.47 4.9 1.4 9.4 25.7 0 1o.411 30.7
Allis-Chalmers ......... 6.52 4-3 6.2 3-7 5.0 66 0 0
International Business
Machines ............ 20.22 7.8 4.0 8. 9  10.9 0 1.5 10.4
International Harvester. 3.93 22.3 27.0 13.0 20.4 io8 0 0
Firestone .............. 6.34 7.2 9.5 6.7 ** 42 ** **
Goodyear .............. 8.32 8.x 11.1 9.8 11.4 13 .1 6. 5
U.S. Rubber ........... o.o3 8.2 9.5 10.2 13.7 ....... 2.0 11.1
Anaconda Copper ....... 4.01 17.4 39.7 20.0 ** 99 ** **
International Nickel .... 16.96 37.1 19-3 36.8 ** ** **
Kennecott Copper ...... 11-03 31.Z 25.9 33.8 ** 0 ** **
Socony-Vacuum ........ 4.97 30.8 48.6 23.6 ** io6 ** **
Standard Oil (N.J.).. 7.24 77.9 izi.6 67.6 ** 65 ** **
Texas Co .............. 7.10 30.4 35-7 27.7 28.3 24 0 0
* Net profit after all charges as per cent of tangible net worth.
# Italics indicate method most advantageous to the particular firm.
t 95 per cent of net after all charges (excluding dividend income), z936-39.
t 8 per cent of invested capital less J of interest paid in z939.§ Net after all charges less dividend income.
II Estimated from Wall Street Journal and other sources (using same definition as in note §).
Tax as per cent of 1940 profits before Federal income taxes.
** Not available.
ft Under the 194r amendments this liability will probably be reduced to $3ooooo, since the income credit is
raised to 95 Per cent of the 1939 earnings ($3,900,00O).
tt Under the 1941 amendments th liability will probably be reduced to $24,000,000, since the income credit is
raised to 9s per cent of the 1939 earnings ($8,910,ooo).
Sou'ce: Computed from SEC Survey of American Listed Corporations.
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corporations, with the notable exception of aircraft-and this exception
may not remain so "notable," in view of upward adjustment of the in-
come credit under the 1941 amendments-this error does not affect the
main point that the present tax will prove very light. The error arises
principally out of the fact that the balance sheet items as tabulated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission contain substantial write-downs
in capital which it is unlikely that the corporations will report in their tax
returns. It is not believed that any substantial error56 arises out of the
consolidated basis upon which the commission's statistics are compiled,
since corporations may choose to file consolidated tax returns insofar as
the excess-profits tax is concerned.
CONCLUSION
An excess-profits tax may be designed to (i) reduce or prevent mo-
nopoly profits, (2) curtail war profits, or (3) serve as an administrative
adjunct to 'some other tax (e.g., the capital stock tax). The excess-profits
tax in effect since 1933 falls in the third category and should be forthwith
repealed, especially since it is so onerous on small business5s The excess-
profits tax enacted as part of the Second Revenue Act of 194o falls largely
in the second class, which is, to that extent, an "emergency" tax. In the
following remarks the author is primarily considering the excess-profits
tax as a permanent type of federal taxation.
Industrial unit of excess-profits taxation.-An excess-profits tax must
logically be restricted to corporations and should not apply to partner-
ships or proprietorships, the excessive profits of which can be most
effectively reached by the individual income tax. Only one possible
exception can be conceived to this statement of policy and this exception
arises out of the tax-exempt character of income derived from govern-
ment obligations. Such income is ordinarily believed to be exempt from
federal taxation on constitutional grounds. These grounds might be less
obstinate in the case of an excess-profits tax on a business firm than in
the case of an individual income tax,S' and to this extent an excess-profits
tax on noncorporate business may be justified. Of course, the proper
solution should be to reach such income under the individual income tax.
Having determined that the proper unit of an excess-profits tax is the
corporation, the question naturally arises as to the definition of the cor-
56 Such error as may be will result in an overstatement of tax liability since the income
credit may be understated as a consequence of the reduction in income by offsetting subsid-
iary losses.
s7 See the author's monograph, op. cit. supra note r, at 67-70.
ss Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (i911).
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porate entity and the treatment of intercorporate transactions. The
statement of policy can again be rather simply made, and that is that
the definition of a corporate unit should approximate reality. But it by
no means follows from this commonplace observation that consolidated
tax returns are in order. In order to determine the true income and,
consequently, a realistic picture of the excessiveness of corporate profits,
it may be necessary for the tax collector to examine the consolidated
accounts of interaffiliated corporations. Existing legislation already
permits him to do so insofar as the normal tax is concerned, 9 but this
by no means results in a consolidated tax return, upon which tax liability
is to be predicated. The consolidated accounts are submitted for in-
formational or auditing purposes only in order to cast light on the reality
of intercompany transactions. This power is ample to take care of any
of the specific examples that may be cited of the alleged need for con-
solidated tax returns under the excess-profits tax. The danger of revenue
loss from consolidated tax returns is less serious in a period of increasing
profits since subsidiary losses (that may be offset against the profits of
other companies) are usually nonexistent.
The filing of consolidated tax returns may be justifiably permitted,
however, wherever the members of the interaffiliated group desiring to
file such a return agree in advance to be regarded as a single entity for
all practical purposes and not only for tax purposes. Such an agreement
would relieve the combine of all the irresponsible features of the holding
company device. Under such circumstances the employment of the
consolidated tax return would not operate as an affirmative tax ad-
vantage to holding companies. The only cases where the corporations
would be willing to make such a declaration probably would be in the
case of railroads and certain other quasi-public enterprises where multiple
state incorporation is frequently required for regulatory purposes. In
these cases the employment of subsidiaries is not for the purpose of cir-
cumventing state control but for the purpose of compliance with the
same. In all other cases, however, it is not likely that a declaration of a
common entity would be made by the members of an affiliated group,
because such a declaration would be tantamount to abandonment of all
the advantages of the holding company technique. The denial of con-
solidated tax returns under such circumstances and the increased taxa-
tion of intercorporate dividends would lead, salutorily, to the simplifica-
tion of corporate structures and increased public revenues-both of which
are desirable objectives.
s9 InL Rev. Code, § 45.
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Definition of excess profits.-The determination whether a given amount
of dollar income represents excess profits that should be subject to special
taxation is a problem that depends upon (a) the method of measuring
the excess profits and (b) upon the time period during which such income
accrued. The definition of excess profits is technically simple-profits
above normal profits. It is the definition of the latter term that con-
stitutes the main problem. Normal profits may be defined in terms of
either (a) performance in the recent past (the income method) or (b) the
relationship of income to capital (the invested capital method).
In view of the wide fluctuations to which various industries and enter-
prises within industries are subject, it is obvious that it is realistically
impossible to define excess profits in as short a period as the calendar
year. It is, therefore, necessary to take into account the earning experi-
ence of the corporation over a period of time in order to prevent injustices
arising among industries and corporations. The present law seeks to take
into account the factor of industrial differences by the "income method"
whereunder the earnings in the four years immediately preceding the
taxable year are taken as a measurement of "normal" profits, the excess
over which are defined as "excess profits" in the taxable year. Under the
invested capital method the time span is completely ignored and profits
are measured as excessive in relation to invested capital. The difficulties
with the income method arise out of the necessity for comparing the tax-
able year with a base period which is really suitable for comparisons-by
no means an easy problem, since corporations are constantly changing
the direction and magnitude of their activities from month to month.
The income method, moreover, is subject to the very grave criticism
that it places a tax premium on all corporations with high or monopoly
profits in the recent past and permits these profits to continue in magni-
tude without taxation (other than the ordinary corporate income tax).
It is therefore suggested that the income method be forthwith abandoned
and exclusive reliance be placed upon the invested capital method for
determining excess profits.
Adjustment for annual fluctuations.-Such a change, however, must
be accompanied by (a) the extension of the net loss carry-over provision
from two years (as presently permitted) to include five or possibly six
years, (b) a redefinition of invested capital, and (c) a technique of pre-
cluding excessive capitalization.
Wherever a corporation over a period of time (say five years) has
earnings in excess of 6, 7 or 8 per cent on capital, such excesses are clearly
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excess profits and not the accidental results of industrial activity in any
given year. As excess profits they could be subject to heavy taxation
without any deleterious effect upon corporate activities or industrial
expansion. The accounting period should be sufficiently long to iron out
all differences and fluctuations among industries.
Such a method would also eliminate most of the complicated statutory
provisions of the present law regarding changes in corporate structure.
The net loss carry-over provision should be available only insofar as the
taxpayer's corporate entity remains the same. In the case of reorganiza-
tion, or liquidation, or succession, etc., operating losses are reflected in
the reappraisal of capital structures and are therefore automatically
adjusted. No provisions are consequently necessary in these special cases.
An important question" is, of course, the date as to when the net carry-
over provision should be permitted. If net operating losses in the past
years are to be allowed as deduction from excess profits in the taxable
year 194o, it may well turn out that profits derived from war armaments
will escape taxation in view of the low earnings record of munitions manu-
facture in the past. This may or may not be a desirable consequence.
If it is deemed essential that profits arising out of the present defense
effort should be at least partially recouped via taxation, irrespective
of the earnings record of such corporations in the past, the net carry-over
provision should be prospective only, that is to say, only operating losses
in the future should be counted. In the event that such operating losses
in 1941-42-43 should outbalance the profits in 1944, it might be well to
provide for a redetermination of the tax liability in i94o-4i, as was done
when the net loss carry-over provision was originally introduced by the
Revenue Act of i918.
If, however, it is not necessary that policy focus with special emphasis
upon the profits from war contracts, it would be easiest to start the net
carry-over provision on the basis of the earnings in the past four years.
The definition of invested capital must be revised in order to eliminate
the present preference shown corporations with a high proportion of
borrowed capital or with extensive holdings in tax-exempt securities or in
corporate stock. It will likewise be necessary to guard against over-capi-
talization of equity money and to assure that recent write-downs in capital
structure will not be lightly undone. These objectives are probably ac-
cepted by most tax-men but their achievements are believed to be beset
with many and insuperable difficulties.
The principal rationales for the partial inclusion of borrowed capital
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were the plea of favoring small business and the administrative argument
of attenuating the practical need for distinguishing between guaranteed
preferred stock and bonds. The former is simply not in accord with the
facts-the preference will be of most advantage to industries that are
characterized by heavy debt financing and not to small enterprise as such.
The latter can be met by an objective rule of thumb, namely, the size of
the so-called "interest" or "dividend" rate. Where this rate is above
5 per cent, say, the capital should be regarded as equity in character;
where below, as creditor capital and be fully excluded.
Likewise, the optional treatment of governmental securities as ad-
missible or inadmissible assets should be removed at once. Certainly
no further premium on tax-exempt securities is warranted at the present
time.
The danger of overcapitalization can be met by a requirement that
capital may not be so great that the sum of profits or deficits for the past
decade-or some suitable period of years-shall be less than a stated
per cent of invested capital-say 2 or 3 per cent. Where the rate of return
over such a period of time is exceedingly low it is obvious that a reorgani-
zation of capital structure is indicated. This problem may not prove
in practice so serious as it may loom in theory, for much has recently
been accomplished in readjusting capital to actual earning capacity. And
these adjustments should not be lost sight of in modem tax administra-
tion.
Valuation is clearly a difficult matter of administration. But the
difficulties are by no means comparable to those confronting the Bureau
of Internal Revenue during World War I. Its own files contain a con-
tinuous record of the profit-and-loss statements and the balance sheets
of substantially all large corporations for practically the last three decades.
Since 1934 most large corporations have been compelled to file trust-
worthy accounts with the Securities and Exchange Commission under
the direct sanction of law. Other federal agencies likewise possess relevant
information on earnings and capital. It is not contended that tax liabili-
ties may be based on data submitted to the government for non-tax
purposes, but tax data and such other data are not wholly irreconcilable.
If discrepancies arise they must be specifically explainable. There is thus
in Washington a wealth of information which cannot but greatly offset
the conventional difficulties of administering a tax based on invested
capital. To use these new sources efficiently, of course, requires imagina-
tion and ingenuity that may not always be found in bureaucracy, but
that does not imply at all that the job cannot be done, and done ably.
